Abstract-We examine the effect of more than 3,400 gun shows using data from Gun and Knife Show Calendar and vital statistics data from California and Texas. Considering the one month following each show and a surrounding area ranging from 80 to 2,000 square miles, we find no evidence that gun shows increase either gun homicides or suicides. The similarity of our estimates for California and Texas suggests that the much tighter California gun show regulations do not substantially reduce the number of firearms-related deaths in that state. Using incident-level crime data for Houston, Texas, we also find no evidence of an effect on other crime categories.
I. Introduction
T HOUSANDS of gun shows take place in the United States each year. Gun control advocates argue that the ''gun show loophole'' makes it easier for potential criminals to obtain a gun; the loophole basically allows unlicensed vendors at gun shows to sell firearms without conducting background checks on purchasers. In support of this claim, gun control advocates commonly cite selected extreme events, such as the April 20, 1999, Columbine High School shooting during which Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold shot 26 students, killing 13. Subsequent investigations by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) revealed that a friend of Harris and Klebold had purchased some of the weapons used in the shooting at a gun show (Obmascik, Robinson, & Olinger, 1999) . Though not an issue generally raised by gun control advocates, one might also be concerned that gun shows increase suicide rates by providing individuals considering suicide with a more lethal means of ending their lives. Proponents, however, argue that gun shows are innocuous since potential criminals can acquire guns quite easily through other black market sales or theft. Gun lobbyists often cite a U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics survey that found that only 0.7% of state prison inmates who had ever owned a gun reported that they obtained it at a gun show (Harlow, 2001) .
In response to the concerns about gun shows, eighteen states have closed the gun show loophole by passing legislation that regulates the private transfer of firearms, and six states have imposed additional regulations on gun shows. 1 Despite this legislative activity, there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of gun shows and, to our knowledge, no studies of the effect of gun shows on gun suicides. 2 This stems in large part from the difficulty of obtaining detailed information on gun shows and outcomes such as crime or mortality. Moreover, because the timing and location of gun shows is clearly not random, it is difficult to infer the causal impact of gun shows by simply comparing geographical areas with frequent gun shows to those with fewer shows. 3 This paper consists of two analyses that study the impact of gun shows on both mortality and crime. The first analysis examines the impact of gun shows on gun and nongun suicides and homicides using a unique ZIP code by week-level data set of all gun shows and deaths in Texas and California from 1994 to 2004. During this period, there were more than 2,200 gun shows in Texas and almost 1,200 gun shows in California.
We chose Texas and California for this analysis for a number of reasons. As the nation's two most populous states, they comprise approximately 20% of the total U.S. population and accounted for 18% of total U.S. gun deaths in 2000 (Office of Statistics and Programming, CDC). In addition, these two states account for more than 13% of the 8.3 million background checks for firearms transfers conducted by the FBI and state agencies in 2005 (Bowling et al., 2006) . They also rank among the top five states in terms of the number of gun shows (U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Treasury, 1999) . Finally, the states' gun show regulatory environments differ significantly: California is known for having the most aggressive gun show regulations, while Texas has none. 1 States became particularly attentive to the gun show loophole after the 1999 Columbine incident and again after the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre. Even though the weapons used in the Virginia Tech shooting were purchased at federally licensed stores and not gun shows, the Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007) put together a report that recommended requiring background checks for firearms sales at gun shows. Governor Kaine made it a priority to enact such a law in 2008, but it was defeated in the Virginia Senate.
2 Lott (2003) examines violent crime rates before and after the introduction of state laws to require background checks for private transfers of handguns. Comparing 9 states that closed this loophole by 1994 to 33 states that never implemented such laws, he finds no evidence that these gun show laws reduced violent crime and, in fact, finds that such laws are positively associated with murder, robbery, and auto theft.
3 Lott (2003) finds that laws requiring background checks at gun shows as well as laws banning assault weapons or imposing waiting periods are negatively associated with the prevalence of gun shows in a state. He also finds that western and rural states tend to have the greatest number of gun shows per capita and that states with higher gun ownership rates have significantly more shows.
To address the potentially endogenous timing and location of gun shows, we examine outcome trends within jurisdictions where gun shows occur, exploiting the high-frequency variation in deaths that we observe in the vital statistics data. Our baseline empirical specification estimates the impact of a gun show on the number of deaths in a ZIP code in the week of a show and the three subsequent weeks relative to the four weeks preceding a show, controlling for ZIP code by year fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. Because ZIP code areas are quite small and because the ZIP codes in which gun shows occur may be primarily commercial (such as a convention center) and attract many attendees from outside the immediate ZIP code, we also estimate specifications that use the number of gun shows that take place within various distances to the home ZIP code.
Overall, we find little evidence that gun shows have a significant effect on each of our four mortality measures: gun homicides, nongun homicides, gun suicides, and nongun suicides. This finding persists across a variety of specifications. First, we arrive at the same finding when estimating our baseline specification separately for California and Texas ZIP codes, despite the differing regulatory environments in each state. Second, the results do not depend on the geographical area considered: 0, 5, 10, and 25 miles from the ZIP code in which the show occurs. Third, the findings are not sensitive to the estimation strategy used or alternative sets of fixed effects. Finally, we do not find evidence of heterogeneous effects over time or across ZIP codes with differing degrees of poverty, urbanicity, and gun ownership.
Using a similar empirical methodology, the second analysis considers the impact of guns shows on gun and nongun violent crimes, as well as property crimes using a census tract by week data set of all FBI Part I crime incidents recorded by the Houston Police Department from 1994 to 2004. We identify the number of shows in each census tract and within various radii of each tract. As in our mortality analysis, we find no evidence that gun shows have a significant effect on crime.
Our analysis has two important limitations. First, we examine only the geographical areas in and around where gun shows take place. To the extent that guns obtained at shows are transported elsewhere, we do not pick up these effects. In addition, our identification strategy relies on high-frequency variation that, by definition, focuses on short-term effects. Specifically, most of our specifications look for spikes in various measures of mortality and crime in the four weeks immediately following a gun show. However, guns are durable and can be used many years in the future, and thus our estimates do not capture these long-run effects. Despite these limitations, we believe that this analysis makes an important contribution to understanding the influence of gun shows, the regulation of which has arguably been the most active area of federal, state, and local firearms policy during the past decade.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background information on gun ownership and the institutional and legal arrangements surrounding gun shows. Section III describes the data used in the analysis, and section IV outlines our empirical strategy. Section V presents our main results, and section VI concludes.
II. Background

A. Gun Ownership in the United States
Firearms manufacturing and ownership in the United States are substantial. Approximately 5 million new firearms were for sale in the United States in 2006, including net imports. 4 Using the 1994 National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms (NSPOF), Cook and Ludwig (1996) estimate that approximately 192 million privately owned firearms, including 65 million handguns, exist in the United States and that about 35% of households own a gun. In contrast, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2000) estimated that approximately 242 million firearms were available for sale or owned by civilians in the United States at the end of 1996, including roughly 72 million handguns, 76 million rifles, and 64 million shotguns.
Previous research generally suggests a positive relationship between gun ownership rates and both gun suicide and homicide rates. That is, increases in gun ownership rates are associated with increases in gun homicide (Duggan, 2001; Cook & Ludwig, 2004) and gun suicide (Kellermann et al., 1992; Sloan et al., 1990; Azrael, Hemenway, & Miller, 2002) .
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B. Institutional Background on Gun Shows
Thousands of gun shows are held in the United States each year. 6 Shows are generally open to the public, though attendees often pay a modest admission fee. Most shows are held over the weekend and last for two days, drawing an 4 Specifically, in 2006, approximately 1.4 million handguns and 2.2 million shotguns and rifles were manufactured in the United States, with just 0.3 million of these exported (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2008). According to Census Bureau statistics published by Shooting Industry magazine, an additional 1.1 million handguns and 0.7 million rifles and shotguns were imported into the United States. See http:// www.shootingindustry.com/Pages/SpecRep6.html#importhand, accessed August 29, 2008. 5 In contrast, Lott and Mustard (1997) find that crime declined in states that passed concealed weapons laws, suggesting that gun ownership reduces crime through deterrence. Though Moody (2001) supports these results, Ayres and Donohue (1999) and Black and Nagin (1998) found that the results were not robust to a variety of assumptions and modeling choices.
6 Lott (2003) states that roughly 1,900 gun shows were held in the United States in 1991 and that this number increased to a high of 2,907 in 1996, but then declined to roughly 2,400 in 2001. Using the same data source (a periodical titled Gun Show Calendar), the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury (1999) came up with a much higher figure for the overall number of gun shows in 1998: 4,442 shows compared with the 2,600 reported by Lott (2003) . 787 SHORT-TERM AND LOCALIZED EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS average of 2,500 to 5,000 people per show. To rent a table from a promoter, vendors pay fees typically ranging from $5 to $50. The number of tables at gun shows ranges widely, from as few as 50 to as many as 2,000 (U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1999).
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The share of guns acquired by private citizens through gun shows appears relatively small compared to other channels. The NSPOF estimated that approximately 239,000 firearms per year were bought at U.S. gun shows and flea markets in 1993 and 1994. This represents just 4% of both long guns and handguns that private individuals acquired from all sources in those years (Cook & Ludwig, 1996) . Similarly, a 1997 survey of 18,000 state prison inmates by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics found that only 0.7% and 1.7% of inmates who had ever owned a gun said they had obtained it at a gun show or flea market, respectively (Harlow, 2001 ). Yet an ATF study (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2000) found that 14% of their criminal trafficking investigations between 1996 and 1998 involved guns purchased from gun shows; about 46% involved straw purchases (an individual purchases a gun for someone else), and 20% involved unlicensed sellers. 
C. The Gun Show Loophole
Certain individuals, primarily felons and those convicted of domestic abuse, are prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm under federal law. 9 The so-called gun show loophole refers to the fact that federal law requires federal firearms licensees (FFLs)-those licensed by the government to manufacture, import, or deal in firearms-to conduct background checks on nonlicensed persons seeking to obtain firearms, but it does not require such checks by those who transfer firearms and do not meet the statutory test of being engaged in the business to do so (Krouse, 2005) . Therefore, whereas a gun dealer operating a gun shop is obliged to conduct background checks on potential buyers, private sellers at gun shows who ''transfer'' firearms do not have to do so. These licensees comprise 50% to 75% of the vendors at most gun shows, so some private venders could use this loophole to entice potential customers to their tables (U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1999) .
A number of states, however, have passed legislation regulating at least some of these sales. For example, California, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia require background checks on all gun purchases, including those at gun shows. Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, and Oregon have less comprehensive regulations but also require background checks for firearms purchased at gun shows (Legal Community against Violence, 2008) . The vast majority of states, however, do not require a background check for transactions occurring at gun shows. Wintemute (2007) compared gun shows in California, which is considered to have ''a uniquely restrictive regulatory environment for gun shows,'' with shows in Arizona, Nevada, Texas, and Florida-four states that do not regulate any private party firearms sales, including those at gun shows. In addition to having background checks, California requires that any individual who purchases a gun, whether at a gun show or anywhere else, wait ten days before receiving the gun. 10 The results from this study suggest that there were fewer illegal straw purchases and undocumented gun sales at California's shows. Thus, one might expect to find a very different effect of gun shows in an aggressively regulated state (California) than in one with no regulations (Texas). We investigate this issue in the sections that follow.
III. Data Description
We create two data sets to investigate whether the number of deaths and crimes changes in the weeks leading up to or following a gun show. The first data set is a week by ZIP code panel of gun show and mortality information for Texas and California for all weeks from 1994 to 2004. The second data set, spanning the same years, is a week by census tract panel of gun shows and seven categories of Part I crime incidents for Houston, Texas. Both data sets are aggregated to the week level (rather than the date) to increase statistical precision and account for the fact that gun shows typically occur on weekends, when mortality and crime rates are likely to differ from other days for reasons unrelated to gun shows. Using a symmetric time period as our unit of observation also reduces the possibility that pre-post comparisons will be driven by factors other than the existence of a gun show. Because approximately 99% of Texas and California gun shows begin on either Friday or Saturday, we begin each week on a Friday and end it on a Thursday. This 7 Various types of firearms are sold at gun shows. These include new and used handguns, shotguns, rifles, semiautomatic assault weapons, and curio or relic firearms (those of historical interest, for example) (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007) . Gun show vendors also usually sell ammunition, gun literature, and gun accessories. Gun shows often include knife vendors and sellers of air guns. For the most part, gun shows offer firearms for both those seeking to purchase handguns as well as sportsmen and hunters (U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1999).
8 See http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/pdf/followingthegun_ internet.pdf. 9 Eight categories under the Brady Act render individuals ineligible to purchase or possess firearms: felony convictions, misdemeanor convictions, fugitive status, an adjudication of mental illness, issuance of a restraining order against the individual, people convicted of drug-related offenses, underage status, or alien status. Many state laws contain these same prohibitions. In addition, some state laws also prohibit people convicted of alcohol offenses and juvenile offenses from buying or possessing firearms (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003) . 10 Additional gun show specific regulations that exist in California are described in California Penal Code 12071.4, which is also known as the Gun Show Enforcement and Security Act of 2000. For instance, this includes the requirement that each vendor at a gun show submits his personal information (name, birth date, driver's license number) as well as that of his employees to the producer of the show. It is also important to note that regulations that apply to the purchase of a firearm at a location other than a gun show generally apply to gun show purchases as well. To examine the impact of gun shows on mortality, we use individual-level vital statistics data for the deaths of all residents of Texas and California. 15 For each death, we identify the date and ZIP code of residence.
16 Consistent with previous research, we use the International Classification of Disease cause-of-death codes to focus on the number of gun and nongun homicides and suicides per week in each ZIP code.
17 Figure 1 also plots the combined number of annual gun homicides and suicides in Texas and California. The number of gun homicides and suicides declined from 8,034 in 1994 to 4,845 in 2000 and then started to slowly move up. This pattern is not being driven by any one state or category of death. In a typical year, approximately 62% and 64% of Texas suicides and homicides, respectively, are committed with a gun compared to 48% and 72% in California.
The second data set is created by merging the Harris County gun show data with data on the number of Part I crime incidents in each Houston census tract in each week from 1994 to 2004. 18 We group the seven Part I crime categories (homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and other thefts) into property crimes (bur- 11 ZIP codes not listed in the 2000 Census were dropped from the analysis since distances to nearby gun shows cannot be calculated. We also omitted ZIP codes with either zero population or zero land area according to the 2000 Census. These ZIP codes are omitted to allow us to consider the number of deaths on a per capita basis and because the mortality data are based on ZIP code of residence rather than ZIP code of death. Similarly, one Houston census tract was dropped.
12 Communications with Garen Wintemute raised the issue that not all gun shows are reported in Gun and Knife Show Calendar. Wintemute and his colleagues found that 298 gun shows were held in California and Texas in 2007 according to both Gun and Knife Show Calendar and the Big Show Journal. But only 79% of these shows were listed in Gun and Knife Show Calendar. The failure to identify such shows could potentially bias our estimates towards 0. Although this is a valid concern, we do not believe this omission will substantially bias our estimates. The shows that are not contained in our data are relatively small, which might be expected to have a smaller impact on gun-related deaths. However, even if these shows are on average no smaller, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that the bias introduced by these omissions is likely to be small. Suppose for simplicity that the true number of homicides in the week after a gun show is X + Y and in any other week is X. Thus, in this simplified example, the true ''effect'' of the gun show in this first week is Y. Assume that the shows we miss occur only in weeks with no gun show (a conservative assumption in that it will maximize the estimated bias). Given that our analysis suggests that 4% of ZIP Â Week observations have one or more gun shows within 10 miles, the figures of Wintemute and his colleagues suggest that an additional 1% of ZIP Â Week observations might have them. Thus, our weighted average for the ''off'' weeks (1 out of 96 of which would actually be ''on'') would be approximately X + (1/96)Y, which would introduce a bias of approximately 1% (leading us to estimate .9896Y instead of Y) in our pre-post analysis. And to the extent that these shows are smaller or also occur in ''on'' weeks, the actual bias is likely to be even lower. 13 The 1990 census tract is used since that is the unit of identification used internally by the Houston Police Department.
14 For the mortality analysis, ZIP code centroids were obtained from the 2000 Census. For the crime analysis, tract centroids were obtained from the 1990 Census. 15 The California data were obtained from the Office of Health Information and Research in the California Center for Health Statistics. The Texas data were obtained from the Center for Health Statistics in the Texas Department of State Health Services. We focus on deaths of state residents to be consistent across states. For instance, while the California data set also includes deaths of non-Californians occurring in the state of California, the Texas data set does not. 16 Deaths with incomplete ZIP code information were dropped from the analysis (0.9% of deaths in Texas and none in California).
17 Deaths due to the accidental discharge of a firearm and those that are firearm related, but for which the cause is undetermined (accidental or committed with intent) can also be identified. We focus on just homicides and suicides given that gun homicides and suicides comprise 96% of gun deaths over our sample period.
18 These data were obtained through an open records request to the Houston Police Department.
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glary, motor vehicle theft, and other theft) and violent crimes (homicide, rape, assault, and robbery) committed with and without a gun.
19 Violent crimes committed with a gun decreased by almost 28% from 1994 to 1998; by 2002, however, they had increased back to the 1994 level. In contrast, a general upward trend in both violent nongun crimes and property crimes was seen over the same period. We present the average weekly number of gun-related deaths per 100,000 residents and also list the corresponding averages for gun homicides and suicides for the 3,525 ZIP codes in our analysis sample. As the first column of the table shows, the average weekly number of gun-related deaths in a ZIP code is 0.309; almost two-thirds of them are accounted for by gun suicides and most of the rest by gun homicides.
21
In column 2, we present analogous information for the 218 ZIP codes that have one or more gun shows during our sample period. Interestingly, the average weekly number of gun-related deaths per 100,000 residents of 0.217 is almost 30% lower than the corresponding average for all ZIP codes; this is primarily driven by a lower number of gun suicides per capita. Column 3 provides similar information for the 1,596 ZIP codes with one or more shows within 10 miles during the eleven-year period. Although gun deaths per capita are also much lower in this set of ZIP codes, gun homicides per capita are almost 15% higher. 19 Whether a firearm was used can be determined for each of the four violent crimes. 20 The online appendix referred to throughout the article is available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00120. 21 Four percent of gun-related deaths in our sample are gun accidents or gun deaths with an undetermined cause.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Table 1 also indicates that ZIP codes with at least one show within 10 miles during our sample period are significantly different from other ZIP codes in terms of demographic characteristics. These ZIP codes have an average population of 25,730, which is 74% greater than the corresponding average of 14,751 for all other ZIP codes. Additionally, the average fraction of the population that is in a rural area is substantially lower in ZIP codes close to a gun show than in ZIP codes with no gun shows (14.5% versus 48.5%). The fraction of the population that is poor is similar between the two groups of ZIP codes, while the fraction that is black or of Hispanic origin is substantially greater among ZIP codes that are close to a gun show (37.0% versus 30.5%). These differences and the others summarized in the table indicate that gun shows tend to occur in more urban areas with lower rates of gun ownership and with higher population densities.
Panel B of table 1 provides analogous information for the 446 census tracts in the city of Houston, Texas, during the 1994 to 2004 period. We see that the 221 census tracts within 5 miles of one or more shows had higher crime rates (nongun violent, gun violent, and property) than the rest of the city. 22 This contrasts with the previous comparison in panel A, though it is important to note that there are only eight tracts in all of Harris County (of which five are in Houston) with one or more shows during the period of interest.
IV. Empirical Strategy
We are interested in examining the impact of gun shows on mortality and crime. The primary challenge stems from the fact that gun shows may occur in places or at times that have more deaths (or greater crime) for other, unobserved reasons. For example, as we saw in table 1, there is some evidence that gun shows occur in places where relatively fewer people own guns. Failing to account for this could lead to spurious estimates of the impact of gun shows on mortality. Similarly, the number of gun shows occurring in Texas and California during weeks in the second quarter of the year is significantly fewer than the number of gun shows in other quarters; once again, this could yield spurious results given the seasonal nature of homicide and suicide. To address this potential endogeneity, we examine outcome trends within jurisdictions where gun shows occur, exploiting the high-frequency variation in deaths that we observe in the vital statistics data. The key identifying assumption of this model and subsequent ones is that the timing of gun shows is not correlated with other factors that might directly influence the homicide or suicide rate. The discussion that follows focuses on our analysis of mortality in Texas and California, but we follow an identical approach when examining crime in Houston.
We begin by estimating models that take the following form:
where y zt is the number of deaths in ZIP code z in week t, and the nshows variables indicate the number of shows that occurred in ZIP code z in the week t + k. That is, the nshows variables are leading or lagging indicators. Specifically, the coefficient b k measures the impact on mortality in the given week of having a gun show k weeks ago. Since 99% of gun shows take place over the weekend and weeks are defined to run from Friday to Thursday, the coefficient b 0 captures the effect of a gun show on gun deaths during the show and in the four or five days immediately following it. Analogously, b À1 measures the effect of a gun show that took place one week ago, while b 1 measures the ''effect'' of a gun show that will take place one week in the future. This event history approach allows for tracing of the mortality in the weeks leading up to and following a gun show. The leading indicators serve two purposes. First, they serve as a test for the presence of unobserved factors that occurred close to the time of a gun show and that may give rise to spurious correlations between gun shows and mortality. Second, they allow us to explore temporal substitution in the number of deaths that might be related to the presence of a show. For example, if potential criminals ''wait'' to commit their crimes until a gun show provides the chance to purchase a firearm, then one might see a decline in deaths leading up to a gun show followed by a spike in deaths immediately after. In practice, the inclusion of leading indicators does not change our results and does not yield any indication of temporal substitution.
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To account for unobservable location and period-specific factors that might be correlated with the occurrence of gun shows and the number of gun-related deaths, we include a set of Location Â Time Period fixed effects, denoted above by c zt . In our baseline model, c zt represents ZIP Code Â Year fixed effects and captures location-specific factors that are either time invariant or change slowly over time (for example, demographic shifts, and changes in police practice). Our baseline model also includes month fixed effects (separate indicators for January, February, and so on) to capture common seasonality-related trends across ZIP codes; this is denoted by k t . We later show that our results are robust to a variety of alternative controls for unobserved location or time effects.
Figures 2 and 3 present event history figures that graph the coefficients on ten leading and ten lagging gun show variables. These provide a full and transparent picture of the potential impacts. For the sake of parsimony, we then estimate models that focus exclusively on mortality in the four weeks following a gun show. We compare the postmonth mortality rate to the mortality rate in the four weeks leading up to a gun show in order to difference out any unobserved ZIP Code Â Time specific factors that might be correlated with gun show timing and mortality. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
where the first term measures the number of gun shows in ZIP code z in the eight-week window around week t . We present the estimate of b 2 , which reflects the difference in mortality in the four weeks following a gun show relative to the four weeks preceding a gun show. As in equation (1), k t and c zt represent month and ZIP Code Â Year fixed effects, respectively. Thus far, we have focused on the relationship between gun shows and gun-related deaths in a particular ZIP code. However, ZIP codes are quite small. The median ZIP code in California (Texas) is only 17 (52) square miles, and the urban ZIP codes in which many gun shows occur are considerably smaller in terms of land area. Indeed, in some cases, the ZIP code in which a gun show occurs is primarily a commercial area with a negligible residential population. Although there are no data on the residential location of gun show patrons, it seems likely that gun shows attract many people outside the immediate ZIP code. 24 Thus, one might expect the presence of a gun show in a particular ZIP code to influence the number of gun-related deaths in neighboring ZIP codes.
If there were a strong reason to believe, ex ante, that gun shows attract patrons within a certain geographical area, then one would want to use this information in determining the proper specification. In the absence of any compelling evidence on this matter, we experiment with specifications that allow gun shows to influence mortality in ZIP codes located within various distances of the show itself. In our baseline specification, we allow gun shows to influence mortality within a 10-mile radius of the ZIP code in which the show took place, which includes more than 300 square miles. In these specifications, the nshows variables reflect the number of gun shows that took place in ZIP codes located within 10 miles of the ZIP code whose mortality we measure. Note that the unit of observation for these regressions is still the ZIP Code Â Week, and the outcome still measures the number of deaths in ZIP code z in week t.
We then present results for 5-mile and 25-mile radii (which includes approximately 80 and 2,000 square miles, respectively), along with results limiting the impact of gun shows to the ZIP code of the show itself. Unlike the other sensitivity analyses we present, the results from these alternative specifications of distance to show will not provide a falsification test for our baseline model. Although we have some intuition that a gun show in one ZIP code will likely influence mortality in neighboring ZIP codes, we have no reason to believe that effects we find within, say, a 25-mile radius are ''better'' than the effects within a 10-mile radius. Instead, one should view this exercise as identifying where potential effects may exist.
A. Estimation
Throughout the analysis, our outcome will be some measure of the number of gun-related deaths in a particular location at a particular time. However, the choice of the correct specification depends in large part on the way in which one believes that gun shows influence gun-related deaths. If one believes that a gun show will reduce the shadow price of purchasing a gun by the same amount for all individuals in each location, then (all else equal) one might expect the impact of the gun show to be proportional to the population in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, a gun show that takes place in a town of 10,000 people might allow the one person who is contemplating suicide sufficiently easy access to a firearm to induce her to kill herself, resulting in one additional gun death. In an otherwise comparable town of 100,000 people, one would expect there to be ten such individuals who might be induced to commit suicide by the ''gun show-induced'' availability of a firearm. This type of proportional effect suggests a specification in which the outcome variable is measured per capita or relative to the average number of deaths in the location. 25 If one believes that gun shows will have a similar impact on the number of deaths across locations regardless of population, one could estimate an OLS model using the number of gun deaths in a particular Location Â Week as the outcome. This specification would be reasonable if one believed that gun shows induce a smaller change in gun availability (a smaller price reduction) for the average person in larger geographical areas because transportation costs limit the access to gun shows in large areas, or perhaps because there are already many alternative ways to 24 Wintemute (2007) provided some evidence that this is the case. In his study, he recorded vehicle licensure at two gun shows in Reno, Nevada, and found that 31% and 32% of vehicles bore California license plates at both of these shows. 25 To the extent that the total population is highly correlated with the number of gun-related deaths in a jurisdiction, models that estimate proportional effects relative to a population base will be quite similar to those that use the number of deaths as the base.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS obtain a firearm without going through standard background checks in larger areas. If the supply of guns available at gun shows is limited relative to the demand, this might also be a reason that the effect is not proportional to the population. Because we believe that the effects of gun shows are likely to be only partially proportional to population size, we estimate several different specifications. To begin, we estimate an OLS model in which the outcome is the number of deaths. 26 In addition, we estimate negative binomial and Poisson regression models. In these models, the mean number of deaths (l) is modeled as an exponential function of the predictors (l = e xb ), so that the resulting estimates reflect the proportional effect of gun shows. Specifically, the exponentiated coefficients from these models can be interpreted as incidence rate ratios, which reflect the percentage effect of gun shows on the number of deaths in a ZIP code.
27 Both the negative binomial and Poisson regressions are consistent under our identifying assumptions. The negative binomial is a generalization of the Poisson regression model that allows the variance of the outcome measure to differ from the mean. This technique is ideal for dealing with count data with overdispersion since it provides more efficient estimates than Poisson regression. In order to accommodate the ZIP Code Â Year fixed effects in our model, we use the fixed-effects negative binomial model developed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) . However, Allison and Waterman (2002) have shown that this model is not a true fixed-effects estimator in the sense that it does not necessarily control for all stable unit-specific covariates as does the standard linear fixed-effects model. Thus, we present estimates from a fixed-effects Poisson regression, which provides consistent estimates in the presence of time-invariant unit-specific confounding factors.
In all models, we account for possible serial correlation within jurisdictions and other forms of heteroskedasticity.
In the OLS models, we estimated Eiker-White standard errors that are clustered by ZIP code. In the negative binomial and Poisson models, we use a block bootstrap where the blocking variable is the ZIP code.
V. Results
We first describe our main results on how gun shows influence mortality rates in California and Texas and then present results that speak to the sensitivity and heterogeneity of these estimates. The final subsection explores the effect of gun shows on gun and nongun violent crime and property crime using data from Houston.
A. The Effect of Gun Shows on Mortality in California and Texas
Following equation (1), figures 2a through 2d present coefficients reflecting the effect of gun shows in the ten weeks prior to and ten weeks following the occurrence of the show. These coefficients come from our baseline model that combines California and Texas and focuses on shows that occur within a 10-mile radius of the ZIP code. The dependent variable is the number of gun homicides, nongun homicides, gun suicides, and nongun suicides, respectively, in the ZIP Code Â Week. All models are estimated using OLS.
The results shown in figure 2 suggest that gun shows do not have a significant effect on any of our four mortality measures. Moreover, the confidence intervals indicate relatively precise estimates. For example, the upper bound of the confidence interval for gun homicides rarely goes above .002 deaths. Given a mean of roughly .022, this suggests we can rule out effects larger than a 9% increase.
Interestingly, for some outcomes like gun homicides and nongun suicides, it appears that mortality rates in a ZIP code during the twenty-week window surrounding a show are somewhat lower than in other weeks during the year in the same ZIP code. While this may be a sampling variability, it is possible that this pattern reflects the presence of some unobserved factor that is correlated with both the occurrence of gun shows and a reduction in mortality. For this reason, our more parsimonious specifications measure the effect of a gun show as the difference between mortality rates in the four-week period following a gun show relative to the four-week period preceding a gun show, the specification detailed in equation (2). Table 2 presents the results from this specification. In addition to showing results for our baseline 10-mile radius, we report results from specifications in which we allow gun shows to influence mortality in locations at various distances from the show. In panel A, for example, we restrict gun shows to influence mortality only within the ZIP code in which the show occurred. In panels B through D, gun shows are allowed to influence mortality in ZIP codes within, respectively, a 5-mile, 10-mile, and 25-mile radius of the ZIP code in which the show occurred. Regardless of the geographical proximity to the show (0, 5, 10, and 25 miles) or the outcome (gun homicide, nongun homicide, gun suicide or nongun suicide), it appears that gun shows have no substantively important or statistically significant impacts on mortality. Table 2 reports the average effect of gun shows in California and Texas. However, as we have noted, California has much stricter regulations on gun shows than Texas, so one might expect the effect of shows to be larger in Texas. 26 This model will suffer from extreme heteroskedasticity given the variation in ZIP code size. Because we present cluster-robust standard errors (clustering by ZIP code), our standard errors will be consistent but not efficient. 27 One might also estimate models with a binary outcome indicating whether the location experienced at least one gun-related death in a given week. This approach may attenuate any effects of gun shows, however. The reason is that large jurisdictions almost always experience at least one death and, conversely, small jurisdictions almost never experience a death. This will tend to bias the coefficients on our gun show indicators toward 0. To see this, consider a large jurisdiction such as Los Angeles that has at least one gun death every week. Here the coefficient on our gun show measures will be 0 by construction. The same will be true for jurisdictions where no gun deaths occur.
SHORT-TERM AND LOCALIZED EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS
To explore this potential heterogeneity, table 3 reports results separately by state for our baseline specification that measures the influence of a show within a 10-mile radius of where it occurred. We find no significant effects of gun shows on any of the four outcomes in either state. In the online appendix (table A2) , we present state-specific estimates for our alternative geographical catchment areas (0 miles, 5 miles, and 25 miles). These results tell a similar story.
B. Sensitivity of Mortality Results
Table 4 explores whether the results above are sensitive to the model specification. Column 1 reproduces the baseline results for gun homicides (table 2, panel C, column 1). Column 2 shows estimates that are weighted by the total population in the ZIP code (from the 2000 Census). The results are extremely similar to the unweighted estimates. Columns 3 and 4 show the exponentiated coefficients (and p-values in parentheses) from negative binomial and Poisson regressions where the outcome is the number of deaths. The sample sizes for these regressions are smaller than the baseline because these models are estimated off the set of observations for which there is at least one gun death in a given ZIP Code Â Year. Column 5 shows the OLS estimates for this same sample to allow one to distinguish between differences due to sample size and those due to model specification. Columns 6 through 10 present parallel specifications for gun suicides. The basic pattern of results-both magnitude and significance-is comparable across specifications for homicides and suicides. (Table A3 in the online appendix shows these results separately by state.) 28 
FIGURE 2.-EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS ON HOMICIDES AND SUICIDES IN CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS
Estimates come from the specification shown in equation (1) in the text. Rather than a one-month lag variable, however, there are ten lag and lead variables that indicate the number of deaths in the ZIP code during that week. Week 0 indicates the week of the gun show. The sample is all ZIP codes in California and Texas that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius during the sample period.
28 Online appendix table A8 shows results separately by ZIP code population. Consistent with the similarity of weighted and unweighted results in table 4, we find no significant patterns by ZIP code population size.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
In our baseline specification, we include ZIP Code Â Year and month fixed effects. In the online appendix (table  A4) , we present results from three alternative sets of fixed effects: separate main effects for month, year, and ZIP code; separate main effects for week defined over the entire sample period (1-573) and ZIP code; and week of year (1-52) and ZIP Code Â Year. The results do not change appreciably across any of these alternative specifications. Table 5 reports estimates of our baseline specification by ZIP code characteristics. To explore whether the effect of gun shows differs by poverty and urbanicity, we present estimates for three mutually exclusive ZIP code categories: (a) ZIPs in which at least 30% of the population is living in a rural area (as defined by the census); (b) ZIPs in which less than 30% are living in a rural area and fewer than 10% The sample for panel A is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show during the sample period. For panels, B, C, and D, it is ZIP codes with at least one gun show within a 5-, 10-, and 25-mile radius, respectively, during the sample period. The sample for columns 1-4 is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius during the sample period. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows during the past month within a 10-mile radius. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on deaths during the month following the show, as compared to deaths during the month prior to the show. The unit of observation is ZIP Code Â Week. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by ZIP code. Uses month and ZIP Code Â Year fixed effects.
C. Heterogeneous Effects
SHORT-TERM AND LOCALIZED EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS
are below the poverty line; and (c) ZIPs where fewer than 30% are living in a rural area but at least 10% are in poverty. These groups are meant to roughly capture rural and urban nonpoor and urban poor areas. We do not see any noticeable patterns across groups (and none of the individual estimates are significantly different from 0). These basic results are not sensitive to moderate changes in the definition of these groups and are similar if one looks within Texas and California separately (table A5 in the online appendix).
To the extent that gun shows influence homicide and suicide rates by increasing the availability of guns, one might think that the effects would be smaller in locations where guns are more readily available. Although we do not have any direct measures of gun ownership, following Azrael, Cook, and Miller (2004) , we use the fraction of suicides committed with a gun as a proxy for gun ownership. Specifically, table 6 shows the results of splitting the sample into three groups: low (bottom 25% of ZIP codes), moderate (middle 50% of ZIP codes), and high (top 25% of ZIP codes) gun ownership. Once again, none of the individual estimates are significantly different from 0. (Online appendix table A6 shows comparable results separately by state.)
Our sample spans eleven years, during which there were substantial economic and political changes along with corresponding changes in national crime statistics. For example, from 1994 to 1999, the number of homicides in the United States decreased by more than 33%; from 1999 to 2004, the annual number of homicides began to slowly increase. As mentioned previously and shown in figure 1, similar patterns are seen in the annual number of gun deaths in Texas and California. For this reason, we estimate our models separately for 1994-1999 and 2000-2004 . The results, shown in online appendix table A7, indicate no notable difference across time periods in either state (all effects are statistically indistinguishable from 0, and relatively small in magnitude).
D. The Effect of Gun Shows on Violent and Property Crime in Houston
The results presented suggest that gun shows in California and Texas do not have a significant short-run effect on local homicide or suicide rates. However, it is possible that the occurrence of a gun show might influence the prevalence of other types of crime, such as assaults or robberies. To examine this issue, we estimate models similar to those discussed on tract-level crime data for Houston from 1994 to 2004. In our preferred specification discussed below, we focus on effects within a 5-mile radius of the gun show and discuss results from OLS regressions where the outcome is the simple number of crimes in a tract week. Figure 3 presents coefficients reflecting the effect of gun shows in the ten weeks prior to and ten weeks following the occurrence of the show, which are based on estimates from equation (1). The solid line reflects the point estimates, and 
(8) , and property crimes (panel C), we see no evidence that gun shows influence the prevalence of any type of crime. With regard to gun violent crimes, the point estimates bounce around 0, never exceeding 0.02, and the 95% confidence interval for most weeks is between À0.02 and 0.02. Given that the number of gun violent crimes in the average tract-week observation is 0.386, this suggests we can rule out effects larger than 6%. For nongun violent and property crimes, our estimates rule out effects larger than 2% and 1%, respectively. To more precisely and parsimoniously summarize these results, table 7 reports estimates of crime effects from equation (2), which describes the impact of a gun show on crime in the four-week period following the show relative to the four-week period preceding the show. None of the estimates The sample is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius during the sample period. Rural is defined as at least 30% rural as defined by the Census. Urban nonpoor is defined as less than 30% rural and less than 10% of percent of population below the poverty line. Urban poor is defined as less than 30% rural and at least 10% of population above the povery line. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows within a 10-mile radius during the past month. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on deaths during the month following the show, as compared to deaths during the month prior to the show. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by ZIP code. The unit of observation is ZIP Code Â Week. Uses month and ZIP Code Â Year fixed effects. The sample is ZIP codes that have at least one gun show within a 10-mile radius and one suicide during the sample period. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows within a 10-mile radius during the past month. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on deaths during the month following the show, as compared to deaths during the month prior to the show. Fraction of suicides committed with a gun is used to proxy gun ownership. Low gun ownership is defined as the bottom 25% of California and Texas ZIP codes; moderate is the middle 50%; and high is the top 25%. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by ZIP code. The unit of observation is ZIP Code Â Week. Uses month and ZIP Code Â Year fixed effects. 797 SHORT-TERM AND LOCALIZED EFFECT OF GUN SHOWS are statistically different than zero, and all are relatively precise. For example, given that the average number of gun violent crimes within a tract-week observation in Houston during this period is 0.386, our estimates imply that we can rule out effects larger than 1.5% of the mean. The estimates for nongun violent and property crimes are even smaller in relative magnitude and equally insignificant.
In results available in the online appendix, we show that the general conclusion of no effect is robust to negative binomial, Poisson and population-weighted OLS estimates (table A9), to specifications that include alternative controls for time and location (table A10), and to alternate choices of geographical proximity to a gun show (table A11) . Finally, in results not reported but available on request, we demonstrate that gun shows have no effect on more finely grained crime categories including robberies, burglaries, motor vehicle thefts, assaults, and rapes. In summary, it appears that the occurrence of a gun show does not significantly affect short-run crime rates in localized areas.
VI. Conclusion
Thousands of gun shows take place in the United States every year. Gun control advocates argue that the gun show loophole that exists in many states makes it easier for potential criminals to obtain a gun. Gun shows may also affect suicide rates by increasing the ease with which individuals who are contemplating suicide can obtain a more lethal device. Opponents of gun show regulations argue that gun shows are innocuous because potential criminals and other individuals can acquire guns easily through other channels.
In this paper, we have investigated the effect of gun shows using eleven years of data on the date and location of every gun show in California and Texas, the nation's two most populous states. To study the effect on mortality (homicide and suicide, in particular), we have combined this with information on the date, location, and cause of every death occurring in these same two states during our eleven-year study period. To study the effect of gun shows on violent and property crime, we combine the gun show data with crime data provided by the Houston Police Department from 1994 to 2004. The sample is census tracts that have at least one gun show within a 5-mile radius during the sample period. The first-month post-show lag indicates the number of gun shows within a 5-mile radius during the past month. The coefficient gives the effect of gun shows on crimes during the month following the show, as compared to crimes during the month prior to the show. The unit of observation is Census Tract Â Week. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by census tract. Uses month and Census Tract Â Year Fixed Effects. (1) in the text. Rather than a one-month lag variable, however, there are ten lag and lead variables that indicate the number of crimes in the census tract during that week. Week 0 indicates the week of the gun show. The sample is all census tracts in Houston that have at least one gun show within a 5-mile radius during the sample period.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Using both event study techniques and specifications that estimate the difference in mortality in the four weeks following a gun show relative to the four weeks preceding a show, we find no evidence that gun shows have an effect on any of our outcome measures: gun and nongun homicides, gun and nongun suicides, gun and nongun violent crimes, and property crime. In addition, the mortality results are the same in both Texas and California, despite the fact that California arguably has the strictest gun show regulations while Texas's regulations are among the least stringent. Thus, our results suggest that gun shows do not increase the number of homicides or suicides and that the absence of gun show regulations does not increase the number of gunrelated deaths as proponents of these regulations suggest.
There are, however, two important caveats to our analyses. First, we are considering only the effect in the geographical area immediately surrounding gun shows. To the extent that firearms purchased at gun shows are transported more than 25 miles away from the show, our identification strategy will not capture this effect. In addition, we consider the effect only in the four weeks immediately following a gun show. However, guns are durable, and thus to the extent that effects occur much later, our analysis will not capture this.
